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A SHAKEUP FOR THE DUTY OF
CONFIDENTIALITY: THE COMPETING
PRIORITIES OF A GOVERNMENT
ATTORNEY IN CALIFORNIA
Jessica Shpall*
I. INTRODUCTION

In the early hours of January 17, 1994, a 6.7 magnitude
earthquake struck the Los Angeles area, killing 72 people and
injuring 1,500.1 92 percent of the structural damage affected
apartment buildings.2 The Northridge quake was the most expensive
disaster California had endured at that time, causing $27 billion in
building damage? In its aftermath, victims filed more than 600,000
insurance claims.' After having paid for earthquake insurance year
after year, many of these policyholders were severely shortchanged
when insurance companies mishandled their cases and denied their
claims.
Consistent with its mission of protecting consumer interests, 6 the
California Department of Insurance ("CDI") investigated how
several insurance companies adjudicated these claims and concluded

* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Spanish Literature,
June 2002, University of California, San Diego. Many thanks to Professor Gary Williams for
recommending this topic and providing invaluable substantive guidance. Professor Sean Scott's
wisdom and helpful critique made the writing process an especially meaningful experience for
me. I dedicate this Note to Ezra and my family, in appreciation of their patience and support.
1. ROBERTA ANN JOHNSON, WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN IT WORKS AND WHY 40 (Lynne
Rienner Publishers 2003) (2002).
2. Id.

3. Lorena Ifiiguez, The Quackenbush Years, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at A24.
4. JOHNSON, supra note 1,at 41.
5. Cindy Ossias, Whistleblower's Tale, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 23, 2003, at 11.
6. See Cal. Dep't of Ins., About Us: An Introduction to CDI Operations,
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0500-about-us/0 100-cdi-introduction/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2008).
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that the companies had not complied with insurance regulations. 7
Instead of fining the companies and forcing them to pay restitution to
the wronged earthquake victims, however, Insurance Commissioner
Charles Quackenbush settled with the companies by allowing them
to make nominal, tax-exempt "donations" to nonprofit
organizations.8
Then, a CDI employee named Cindy Ossias blew the whistle,
exposing the truth about Quackenbush's donation scheme.9 When
the California State Assembly Committee on Insurance ("Insurance
Committee") asked Ossias about the dubious settlements, she handed
over internal CDI documents." Partially as a result of her actions,
testimony before lawmakers revealed that the insurance
commissioner had failed to sufficiently discipline the insurance
companies and, worse yet, used the settlement funds for personal
gain." Quackenbush eventually resigned. 2
If Ossias had been a CDI research analyst, secretary, or
investigator, she would have quietly returned to work because
California's whistleblower statutes protect employees from
employment retaliation. 3 Because Ossias was a CDI attorney,
however, she was far from off the hook. The State Bar of
California 4 began to investigate whether she had violated her duty of
confidentiality by revealing the documents to the legislature." By
favoring her duty to serve the public over whatever duty of

7. COMM. ON PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY & CONDUCT, STATE BAR OF CAL., REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION ON AB 363, AT 4 (2001), available at http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/
pdfs/3cp0l07c.pdf [hereinafter COPRAC REPORT].
8. Ossias, supra note 5.
9. Id,
10. Id.
11. Ifiiguez, supra note 3.
12. Virginia Ellis, State InsuranceDept. Reinstates Whistle-Blower, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2000, at A33 [hereinafter Ellis, InsuranceDept. Reinstates Whistle-Blower].
13. See CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 8547.8, 53298 (West 2007).
14. All references to the legislature, state bar, or supreme court relate to California entities
unless otherwise noted.
15. RICHARD A. ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
550 (2d ed. 2001).
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confidentiality she may have owed to her "client," 6 Ossias almost
lost her ability to practice law. 7
Government attorneys' 8 in California are caught between
competing policies. On one hand, as government employees, they
are encouraged by the whistleblower protection statutes to report
misconduct in their departments. 9 On the other, as attorneys, they
have sworn to maintain their clients' confidentiality." This tension
forces a government attorney who has witnessed wrongdoing to
choose between her desire to serve the public and her ethical
obligations as a lawyer.
After the Ossias affair, both the legislature and the state bar
recognized the need to clarify when and how a government attorney
can safely blow the whistle on official misconduct without risking
her ability to practice law. After several attempts, however, no new
rules or laws have been passed.2' While ultimately no action was
taken against Ossias, the bar prosecutor made it clear that his
decision to drop the case was not precedential"
As a result, a
government attorney contemplating whether to blow the whistle in
the future would face the same uncertainty as Ossias but might
instead decline to disclose the wrongdoing, allowing the harm to
continue. Who knows how many other government attorneys have
chosen to remain silent to the detriment of the public good?
This Note explores the tension between the competing policies
of government transparency and client confidentiality, ultimately
proposing a way for the California Supreme Court to better address
this issue. Part II will discuss the factual background of the Ossias
affair. Part III will examine the current legal framework governing
whistleblower protections and the duty of confidentiality. Part IV
16. See infra Part IV.C. The question of to whom a government attorney owes the duty of
confidentiality is far from clear in California. Depending on how one defines the government
"client," it is very possible that Ossias did not violate her duty of confidentiality.
17. Telephone Interview with Cindy Ossias, Senior Staff Counsel, Cal. Dep't of Ins. (Sept.
24, 2007).
18. The term "government attorney" may include both attorneys who work full-time as
public servants and private counsel retained by the government. COPRAC REPORT, supra note 7,
at 11 n.30.
19. See CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 8547.8, 53298 (West 2007).
20. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 2007).
21. See infra Part lI.B.
22. Letter from Donald R. Steedman to Richard Alan Zitrin (Oct. 11, 2000), in ZITRIN &
LANGFORD, supra note 15, at 551 [hereinafter Steedman Letter].
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will consider how this framework fails to meet the ethical concerns
of government attorneys.
Part V will propose solutions that
reconcile these problems without compromising the traditional
division of labor between the legislature and the judiciary.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Ground Shakes at the Department of Insurance
After the Northridge earthquake, the CDI investigated how
several insurance companies evaluated claims and concluded that the
claim practices did not comply with insurance regulations.23 CDI
attorneys and examiners compiled grievances against the insurance
companies into confidential internal reports called "market conduct
examination reports" ("MCE Reports").24
CDI attorney Cindy Ossias participated in preparing the MCE
Reports."
She and her colleagues found that the insurance
companies had mistreated policyholders by conducting cursory
damage inspections, making insufficient settlement offers to pay for
repairs, unreasonably delaying payments, and then denying
supplemental claims based on an alleged expiration of the statute of
limitations.26 As a result, CDI staff members recommended that the
companies pay multimillion-dollar fines and restitution to
claimants.2 7
Instead of commencing legal action against the insurance
companies, Insurance Commissioner Charles Quackenbush settled
with the companies.2 8 Quackenbush agreed not to impose fines or
complete the MCE Reports if the insurers would make donations to

23. COPRAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 4.
24. Telephone Interview with Cindy Ossias, supra note 17.
25. Id.
26. Ossias, supra note 5.
27. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 42 (stating that CDI lawyers recommended a fine of $119
million for State Farm alone, and that total fines against insurers for improper action in
Northridge may have totaled as much $3.7 billion). Ossias testified before the Assembly
Insurance Committee that she had expected fines to range from $20-40 million. COPRAC
REPORT, supra note 7, at 4.
28. Virginia Ellis & Carl Ingram, Whistleblower Emerges in Quackenbush Probe, L.A.
TIMES, June 23, 2000, at A2 1.
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charitable foundations dedicated to earthquake education and relief"
These donations totaled $12 million and were tax-deductible. °
When Ossias and her colleagues noticed the large discrepancy
between the penalties they recommended and the tax-deductible
donations represented in the settlement agreements, they were
"appalled."'3 Both the Los Angeles Times and the legislature also
noticed the suspicious settlement terms and began investigating
Quackenbush's actions.32 In January 2000, when a consultant to the
chairman of the Insurance Committee asked Ossias whether she
knew anything about the settlements, she "put him off at first,
grappled with [her] conscience and then offered him the [market
conduct examination] reports.

'33

Once Ossias turned over the

reports, the Insurance Committee revealed them to the public by
posting salient portions of them on the Internet.34 In the course of a
department-wide investigation that Quackenbush initiated,35 Ossias
admitted during an "interview/interrogation" that she was the
whistleblower. 36 The next day, department management ordered her
to "vacate the premises immediately" and take administrative leave.37
Once the legislature and the California Attorney General began
to investigate the matter, information about Quackenbush's political
and personal involvement with those charitable foundations
receiving "donations" began to surface. 3' Testimony revealed that
the "commissioner personally ordered his staff to collect $4 million
in settlements with title insurance companies for TV commercials

29. Telephone Interview with Cindy Ossias, supra note 17.
30. Ifiiguez, supra note 3. Quackenbush's California Research and Assistance Fund
received $12.8 million in tax exempt "voluntary contributions" from insurance companies. Id.
Firemen's Fund paid $550,000 to a special fund to avoid further investigation, Allstate paid $2
million to the California Research and Assistance Fund, and 20th Century Insurance and State
Farm also donated to special foundations. Id.
31. Ossias, supra note 5; see also ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 15, at 550.
32. ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 15, at 550.
33. Ossias, supra note 5.
34. Ellis & Ingram, supra note 28.
35. Ellis, InsuranceDept. Reinstates Whistle-Blower, supra note 12.
36. Ossias, supra note 5.
37. Id.
38. Ifiiguez, supra note 3. Instead of addressing earthquake-related issues, the foundations
sponsored a poll about Commissioner Quackenbush's political reputation and funded a football
training program that two of Quackenbush's children attended. Id.
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featuring Quackenbush."39 Two days later, on June 28, 2000,
Quackenbush announced his resignation.4 °
Ossias was eventually reinstated by Quackenbush's successor in
August 20004' and continues to work at the CDI today. 42 Ossias was
not fired as a result of her actions because California whistleblower
laws protect government employees from retaliation. 43 However,
Ossias's status as an attorney was threatened when the California
State Bar's Office of Trial Counsel began investigating whether her
45
disclosure of confidential material 44 merited disciplinary measures.
Eventually, the state bar discontinued the investigation without
determining whether Ossias acted unethically.46 In a letter to
Ossias's attorney, 47 the state bar prosecutor never specified who was
Ossias's client or whether she had breached her duty of
confidentiality.48
Ossias was forced to choose between her desire to report
government wrongdoing and her binding ethical duty as an attorney
to maintain client confidentiality. Because attorney conduct is
governed both by statute 49 and Rules of Professional Conduct
promulgated by the California Bar and approved by the California
Supreme Court," both the legislature and the state bar considered
ways to clarify the relationship between the policy for government
transparency and a government attorney's duty of confidentiality."

39. Id. Ossias also testified that "she and other insurance department lawyers had been
ordered to shred documents containing their recommendations for fines against the companies."
Ellis, Insurance Dept. Reinstates Whistle-Blower, supra note 12.
40. Ellis, InsuranceDept. Reinstates Whistle-Blower, supra note 12.
41. Id.

42. See Telephone Interview with Cindy Ossias, supra note 17.
43. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 8547.8, 53298 (West 2007).
44. The duty of confidentiality is codified in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West

2007).
45. ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 15, at 550.
46. Id. at 550-52.
47. Steedman Letter, supra note 22.
48. ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 15. Instead, the state bar prosecutors "exonerated
Ossias on whistleblowing and public policy grounds." Id.; see infra Part IV.2.
49. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000-6238.
50. CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1-100(A).

51. COPRAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
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B. The Legislature and Bar
Try to Pick Up the Pieces

Soon after the Ossias investigation, Assemblyman Darrel
Steinberg (D-Sacramento) proposed Assembly Bill 363 ("A.B.
363"), which would create an exception to the duty of confidentiality
enumerated in section 6068(e) of the California Business and
Professions Code. 2 The bill was drafted to protect government
lawyers in California from the threat of losing their bar licenses
when they revealed confidential information to expose wrongdoing.
While the assembly was considering A.B. 363, Assemblyman
Steinberg requested that the attorney general's office comment on
whether "'whistleblower' statutory protections applicable to
employees of state and local public entities supersede the statutes and
rules governing the attorney-client privilege[.]" 54 The opinion
concluded that the legislature, in passing the whistleblower statutes,
did not intend to override the ethics provisions governing attorneyclient privilege. 5
The assembly passed A.B. 363 and the California Senate's SubCommittee on the Judiciary took it under submission.56 Soon, the
state bar became interested in the possibility of amending the Rules
of Professional Conduct, instead of the Business and Professions
Code. On July 9, 2001, the senate suspended its hearings to allow
the bar to conduct its own study of how A.B. 363 might impact
government lawyers.5
The California Bar's Committee on Professional Responsibility
and Conduct ("COPRAC") determined that, instead of a statutory
52. Virginia Ellis, Bill ProposesProtectionsfor State Lawyers, L.A. TIMES, Feb 22, 2001, at

A3 [hereinafter Ellis, Bill Proposes Protections];see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e).
53. Ellis, Bill Proposes Protections,supra note 52.
54. 84 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 71, 71 (2001) [hereinafter Attorney General]. Although both the
Steinberg query and the Attorney General's opinion seem to use the terms "attorney-client
privilege" and "duty of confidentiality" interchangeably, the net result of the Attorney General's
conclusion is that the whistleblower laws do not automatically override statutes that deal with
attorney conduct. See Charles S. Doskow, The Government Attorney and the Right to Blow the
Whistle: The Cindy Ossias Case and Its Aftermath (a Two-Year Journey to Nowhere), 25
WHITTIER L. REv. 21, 38-39 (2003) [hereinafter Doskow, Two-Year Journey to Nowhere].
55. Attorney General, supra note 54, at 71; Doskow, Two-Year Journey to Nowhere, supra
note 54, at 38 (characterizing the opinion as "fram[ing] the issue as one of precedence and
legislative intent").
56. COPRAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 2 n.4.
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id.
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exception, it would be more effective for the California Supreme
Court to amend Rule of Professional Conduct 3-600, titled
"Organization as Client," to specifically address the needs of
government attorneys. 9
The California State Bar's Board of
Governors adopted the change and sent it to the California Supreme

Court for approval.6" The supreme court, in a terse opinion, denied
the request on the grounds that "the proposed modifications conflict
with Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e). '61

After the supreme court denied the request to modify the Rules
of Professional Conduct, the senate resumed its debate of A.B. 363
and eventually passed a bill containing a statutory exception to the
duty of confidentiality for government attorneys.6 2
However,
Governor Gray Davis vetoed the bill, fearing that the attorney-client
relationship would be weakened by the exception. 63 After Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger took office, Assemblywoman Fran Pavley
introduced a new incarnation of A.B. 363 that also passed both
houses with bipartisan support.' On September 28, 2004, Governor
Schwarzenegger vetoed the bill, arguing that government officials
would react to the new policy by leaving government attorneys out
of the decision-making process.6 5 In 2006, Pavley introduced

59. Id. at 2-3. Rule 3-600 identifies the "client" of an attorney representing an organization
and a reporting scheme in the case of internal wrongdoing. CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3-600.
COPRAC noted that the current focus of Rule 3-600 is limited to attorneys who represent private
organizations. COPRAC REPORT supra note 7, at 3. Amending Rule 3-600 to address the needs
of government attorneys was the preferred approach because the A.B. 363 would "permit
government attorneys to make disclosure to anyone based on the attorney's unilateral judgment
that a government official has engaged in misconduct." Id. For an in-depth study of Rule 3-600
and the proposed changes, see infra Parts IV.C, V.B.
60. Doskow, Two-Year Journey to Nowhere, supra note 54, at 42-43.
61. In re Adoption of Amendments to Rule 3-600 of the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, No.
S104682 (Cal. 2002) (on file with the state bar); Don J. DeBenedictis, Justices Reject Bar's
Whistleblower Rule, L.A. DAILY J. May 14, 2002, at 3.
62. Doskow, Two Year Journey to Nowhere, supra note 54, at 46.
63. Id. at 48 (citing Letter from Gray Davis, Governor of the State of Cal., to Members of
the Cal. State Assembly, Veto of Assembly Bill 363 (Sept. 30, 2002), available at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_0351-0400/ab_363_vt_20020930.html).
64. MANUEL VALENCIA, 1612 ASSEMBLY BILL ANALYSIS 3 (2006), available
at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_1601-1650/ab_1612_cfa 20060118_170017
asm floor.html. The bill was officially called A.B. 2713. Id.
65. Letter from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of the State of Cal., to the Members of
the California State Assembly, Veto of Assembly Bill 2713 (Sept. 9, 2004), available at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_2701-2750/ab_2713_vt_20040928.html.
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another draft of the bill, A.B. 1612.66 The Assembly approved the
measure, but Pavley retracted her sponsorship when it became
apparent that the governor would not allow the bill to become law.67
Despite the strong political will to clarify the priorities of a
government attorney, the momentum incited by Cindy Ossias'
experience has reached an impasse. The next part of this Note will
evaluate the existing legal framework that creates these conflicting
messages of transparency and secrecy.
III. EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Government attorneys in California are caught between two
contradictory sets of laws. On one hand, whistleblower statutes
promote transparency in government, while on the other, the rules
and statutes governing legal ethics" require that attorneys keep client
information confidential.
The whistleblower statutes are not
mandatory but rather encourage government workers to disclose
"improper governmental activities"69 by protecting them from
retribution.7"
In contrast, all lawyers must comply with the
provisions that address confidentiality, and any deviation could
subject an attorney to discipline by the state bar.7' The only safe
course of action for an attorney in Cindy Ossias's position is to
maintain the government "client's"72 absolute confidentiality.73 This
situation, however, means that the whistleblower statutes effectively

66. Assem. B. 1612, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/

pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab 1601-1650/ab_1612_bill_20060104_amendedasm.pdf.
67. Marisa Huber, Ethics Year in Review, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 867, 905 (2007). The
state bar firmly opposed this proposed exception to the duty of confidentiality because it felt that
the duty was being threatened by exceptions to the duty enacted under Federal law and in the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. (citing Nancy McCarthy,
Bar Opposes Whistleblower Bill, CAL. ST. B.J., Apr. 2006, at 1.
68. Because California attorney regulation is jointly governed by statute and rules of
professional conduct, this Note also refers to the entire system of regulation as "the ethics
provisions."
69. CAL. GOV'T CODE. § 9149.21 (West 2007).

70. Id. § 8547.1.
71. RICHARD C. WYDICK, REX. R PERSCHBACHER & DEBRA LYN BASSETT, CALIFORNIA
LEGAL ETHICS 44-46 (5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA LEGAL ETHICS].
72. Defining the attorney's client is a challenging task and is therefore the source of much
debate. See, e.g., COPRAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 14; Wayne C. Witkowski, Who is the Client
of the Municipal Government Lawyer?, in MUNICIPAL LAW INSTITUTE (SEVENTH ANNUAL) 117,
155-56 (2007).
73. See COPRAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 18.
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do not apply to government attorneys. As a result, the legislature's
goal of promoting transparency in government is consistently
overshadowed by the duty of confidentiality. In the following
discussion, this Part will set forth the competing policies of
government transparency and client confidentiality.
A. The Whistleblower Statutes

Whistleblowing is considered to be a form of internal dissent,
whereby a member of an organization speaks out against
wrongdoing.74 Statutes that encourage whistleblowing are intended
to promote a government employee's ethical duty to expose "waste,
fraud, and abuse."" Whistleblowers are an integral part of the
system of checks and balances; they sound the alarm when
individuals or government entities threaten to overstep their
authority.76 Moreover, these statutes have a deterrent effect on
misconduct.77 Faced with the possibility of exposure, an official
would be reticent to abuse his power because it would be harder to
hide.
Although whistleblower-type protections trace back to the Civil
War era,7" officials have been concerned about public cynicism and
distrust of the government since the 1960s.79 Modern whistleblower
protections are one way to improve the public's perception of the
government. 0 The fact that many states and the federal government
have enacted whistleblower statutes8 ' reflects a widespread
commitment to this policy.82

74. JOHNSON,supra note 1, at 3-4.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Id.at 11.
77. Id. at 75.
78. Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of
Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1904 (2007) (discussing the Union
government's policy of paying whistleblowers who exposed fraud related to the sale of munitions
and war supplies).
79. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 16.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 32
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-19, 1221, 1222, 3352 (2000)); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-532
(2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-50.5-101 (2007).
82. See Macey, supra note 78, at 1901 ("[T]he recent positive publicity for whistleblowers
suggests that whistleblowing is now viewed with less suspicion-and whistleblowers as less
politically motivated and more altruistic-than was true in the past.").
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There are several provisions scattered throughout the California
Government Code that provide guidance to whistleblowers. The
California Whistleblower Protection Act83 codifies the legislature's
finding that "public servants best serve the citizenry when they can
be candid and honest without reservation in conducting the people's
business."84 An employee is authorized to disclose improper
behavior that violates any law or regulation, or "is economically
wasteful, or involves gross misconduct, incompetency, or
Upon receiving information about improper
inefficiency."85
behavior, the state auditor86 is empowered to investigate the issue and
report to the appropriate oversight body.87 The whistleblower often
remains anonymous." Moreover, the statutes expressly prohibit
employees from intimidating or retaliating against the
whistleblower.89
The Whistleblower Protection Act applies to all individuals
"appointed by the Governor or employed or holding office in a state
agency,"9 which includes attorneys.9' Local government employees
are also protected by whistleblower provisions.9" Depending on
which whistleblower statute applies, private counsel retained by the
government may not always be protected from termination for
speaking out against improper government activity.93
In passing the statutes, the legislature intended to facilitate and
encourage whistleblowing in order to promote integrity in
government. 94 However, the language of the statute makes it clear
83. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 8547-48.5 (West 2007).
84. Id. § 8547.1.
85. Id. § 8547.2(b).
86. Although the statutes do not specifically limit to whom a whistleblower can report, they
authorize the state auditor, state legislature, or a "local agency" to receive reports from
government employees. Id. §§ 53297, 8547.5, 9149.23.
87. Id. §§ 8547.5 to .7.

88. Id. § 8547.5
89. Id. §§ 8547.8, 53298.
90. Id. § 8547.2(a).
91. Attorney General, supra note 54.
92. See CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 53296-53299.
93. See 3 WITKIN SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Agency and Employment § 258, at 337
(10th ed. 2005) (citing CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 8547-8548.5, which is limited to protecting "state
employees"). Witkin is widely used by California practitioners. But see CAL. GOV'T CODE §
improper
9149.21 (West 2007) ("[S]tate employees and other persons should disclose ...
governmental activities." (emphasis added)).
94. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 9149.21; Attorney General, supra note 54.
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that whistleblowing is optional.95 Furthermore, employees are not

authorized
to reveal "information otherwise prohibited by or under
9'6
l aw .

B. A CaliforniaAttorney's Duty of Confidentiality
The whistleblowing statutes encourage government employees,
including attorneys, to act ethically by revealing waste and

wrongdoing in the government. Yet, the competing duty to protect
client confidentiality97 is one of the most important ethical duties of a
lawyer.98
Attorney behavior in California is governed by two bodies of
law: California Business and Professions Code sections 6000-6238
("Code") and the California Rules of Professional Conduct
("Rules").99 Members of the state bar could be subject to discipline

for a violation of either the Code or the Rules.

0

The duty of confidentiality is codified in section 6068(e)(1) of
the California Business and Professions Code, which mandates that

an attorney "maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself or herself to preserve the secrets, 1 ' of his or her client."'0 2
Between 1880 and 2003, the only amendment to the language of this
provision made the pronouns gender-neutral.0 3 In 2003, the

legislature passed the sole statutory exception to the duty of
95. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 9149.21.
96. Id. § 8547.3(d); see also id. §§ 9149.21, 9149.23(c).
97. The duty of confidentiality is broader in scope than the attorney-client privilege, which
an attorney can assert before a court when trying to protect a communication from being
considered in evidence. See, e.g., In re Johnson, Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l
Responsibility & Conduct, 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179 (2000); Kevin E. Mohr, California's
Duty of Confidentiality: Is It Time for a Life-Threatening Criminal Act Exception?, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 307, 317 n.28 (2002) (explaining that the attorney-client privilege also applies to
discovery).
98. 1 WITKIN CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Attorneys § 118 at 155-57 (4th ed. 1996)
[hereinafter WITKIN, Attorneys].
99. See CALIFORNIA LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 71, at 44.
100. See id. at 44-46.
101. The statute's use of the words "confidence" and "secrets" has been criticized for failing
to adequately define the confidential information it seeks to protect. See, e.g., Proposed Cal. Rule
of Prof l Conduct 3-100 (1998) (on file with the state bar).
102. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)(1) (West 2007).
103. Charles Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux: Conscience, Clarity and Confidentiality in
California, PROF. LAW., Spring 2004, at 22 [hereinafter Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux]. There
were also a few judicially imposed exceptions. CALIFORNIA LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 71, at
187.
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confidentiality. " The exception allows an attorney to reveal
confidential information where the attorney "reasonably believes the
disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the attorney
reasonably believes is likely to result in death of, or substantial
bodily harm to, an individual."'' 5
The Rules merely supplement this statutory duty of
confidentiality." 6 Rule 3-100 prohibits a state bar member from
revealing confidential information under section 6068(e)(1) unless an
exception applies or the client gives informed consent. 7 Rule 3-100
then reiterates the exception mentioned in section 6068(e)(2) and
provides guidance about the steps a bar member should take when
revealing information to prevent a criminal act that could result in
substantial injury or death.'0°
The duty of confidentiality is one of the key aspects of the
attorney-client fiduciary relationship. 9 It is "fundamental" to the
existence of our legal system."0
On an individual level,
confidentiality ensures that a client is completely free to trust her
lawyer with sensitive information, thereby promoting open
communication."' This level of communication allows the attorney
to provide sound advice either in a planning or litigation context.
Confidentiality also enriches the entire legal system by encouraging
potential clients to seek legal advice. ' 2 Such advice is beneficial
both to the client and arguably to the larger society."1 3 For attorneys,

104. Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 103, at 22-23.
105. CAL. BUS. & PROF CODE § 6068(e)(2).
106. In fact, there was no rule mentioning the duty until the legislature passed the statutory
exception to confidentiality in 2004. Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 103, at 22.
107. See CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3-100(a).
108. Id.
109. WITKIN, Attorneys, supra note 98.
110. People ex rel. Dep't of Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 378 (Cal.
1999).
Ill. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 500 (Cal. 1994) ("It is
essential to the proper functioning of the lawyer's role that the client be assured that matters
disclosed to counsel in confidence remain sacrosanct ...").
112. Roger C. Cramton, Proposed Legislation Concerning a Lawyer's Duty of
Confidentiality,22 PEPP. L. REV. 1467, 1477 (1995).
113. For example, if a company is contemplating how to dispose of waste, consulting an
attorney might not only prevent litigation but could also protect the public from possible health

risks.
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the duty of confidentiality is a reminder of the importance of
undivided loyalty to one's client." 4
As discussed, however, the existing framework results in tension
between the policies of government openness and client
confidentiality. Although the binding duty of confidentiality carries
more weight than the statutes that protect whistleblowing,"' there
may be occasions where this dynamic could further empower an
official to take advantage of the public trust by committing fraud,
knowing full well that his attorney's lips are sealed.
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM

Government attorneys are torn between these competing values
of transparency and secrecy. While the whistleblower statutes
encourage these attorneys to listen to their conscience, the ethics
provisions mandate that they ignore this awareness in favor of client
confidentiality. The first problem with this system is that while the
legislature and the supreme court have an interest in protecting the
duty of confidentiality, the legislature ends up completely controlling
the scope of this duty because it is enshrined in statute. This power
imbalance stymies debate in the legal community about possible
exceptions to this duty. Second, the lack of an express exception to
the duty of confidentiality forces the state bar to choose between
prosecuting an otherwise innocent attorney or ignoring the ethics
provisions, resulting in inconsistent application of ethical rules.
Finally, the Rule of Professional Conduct that governs organizational
clients fails to take into account the unique position of a government
attorney. This lack of guidance makes it difficult for these attorneys
to identify their client for purposes of understanding to whom they
owe the duty of confidentiality.

114. Anderson v. Eaton, 293 P. 788, 790 (Cal. 1930) (stating that confidentiality keeps "the
honest practitioner from putting himself in a position where he may be required to choose
between conflicting duties ... rather than to enforce to their full extent the rights of the interest
which he should alone represent").
115. In fact, the statutory duty of confidentiality overrides the effect of the whistleblower
protections; the statutes do not apply to whistleblowing prohibited by law. CAL. GOV'T CODE §
9149.21 (West 2005). Therefore, since the duty of confidentiality is also codified by statute, an
attorney who discloses a client's confidential information would not be immune to retaliation
under the whistleblower protection statutes.
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A. Legislative Control of the Duty of ConfidentialityPrevents the
Supreme Courtfrom Participatingin the ConfidentialityDiscussion
Although both the legislature and supreme court theoretically
have an interest in preserving the duty of confidentiality, in practice,
the legislature alone controls the duty. As such, housing the duty of
confidentiality in the Business and Professions Code impedes the
supreme court from exercising its inherent power over the duty of
confidentiality. In the following examination this issue, this Part will
discuss the basis for each branch's control over confidentiality and
explain the dynamics of the power-sharing between the two
branches.
1. The Evolution of the California Legislature and
Supreme Court's Shared Power over Attorney Conduct
The legislature and the supreme court both have an interest in
promoting good attorney conduct. The supreme court must ensure
that the legal system functions properly since this is one of the
court's main duties under the California Constitution.' 6 In contrast,
the legislature seeks to protect the public at large".7 by preventing
attorneys from abusing their positions of power. Therefore, the
legislature is also allowed to regulate attorney conduct. It "may put
reasonable restrictions upon constitutional functions of the courts
provided they do not defeat or materially impair the exercise of those
functions."' '1
The legislature has a long history of regulating attorney conduct.
9
In 1927, the legislature formally adopted the Bar Act ("Act"),"1
2
which is now a part of the California Business & Professions Code. 1
The Act created an integrated state bar.' Prior to the passage of the
Act, existing voluntary bar associations experienced difficulty in

116. See CAL. CONST. art. Vi, § 1; In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d 49, 54 (Cal.
1998).
117. In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d at 61.
118. Brydonjack v. State Bar, 281 P. 1018, 1020 (Cal. 1929).
119. WITKIN, Attorneys, supra note 98, § 358.
120. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000-6428 (West 2007). This part of the Business and
Professions Code "may be cited as the State Bar Act." Id. § 6000.
121. In an "integrated bar," all practicing attorneys in the state must be members. See Keller
v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 5 (1990). Additionally, the California Constitution now mandates that
"[e]very person admitted and licensed to practice law in this State is and shall be a member of the
State Bar." CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
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enforcing professional standards and assimilating the large waves of

attorneys arriving in California.'
Moreover, laypersons posing as
lawyers had created a fiercely competitive market for clients.'23
The Act officially recognized the supreme court's tradition of
assuming jurisdiction over attorney discipline.'24 The Act also
established the state bar as a "public corporation"' 25 to help the
supreme court carry out its disciplinary duties.'26 The state bar is7
2
merely an "administrative assistant to or adjunct of [the] court.'
The supreme court is the ultimate arbiter of admittance to practice
law, suspension, and disbarment. 2 8
Once the Act codified the California Supreme Court's
disciplinary power over attorneys, the court in 1928 adopted its own
Rules of Professional Conduct.'29 Today's Rules patch together
aspects of the American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Rules, the
old ABA Model Code, and earlier California legal ethics rules. 3 ° To
amend a Rule of Professional Conduct, the California Bar's Board of
Governors adopts a draft amendment and submits it to the supreme
court for approval. 3 '
In California, like in most states, the supreme court oversees the
entire judicial system.'

"[T]he power to regulate the practice of

law, including the power to admit and to discipline attorneys, has
long been recognized to be among the inherent powers of the article
VI [of the California Constitution] courts."' 3 3 Despite the fact that
122. CORINNE LATHROP GILB, SELF-REGULATING PROFESSIONS AND THE PUBLIC
WELFARE: A CASE STUDY OF THE CALIFORNIA BAR 36 (1956) (Ph.D. dissertation, Radcliffe
College).
123. Id. at 36-37. One observer noted that out of 6,000 attorneys working in San Francisco,
only 600 were actually legally authorized to do so. Id.
124. See In re Stevens, 241 P. 88, 92 (Cal. 1925) (holding that the supreme court has "original
jurisdiction to determine applications for restoration to practice of attorneys and counselors at law
after disbarment").
125. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
126. In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d 49, 58-59 (Cal. 1998).
127. Id. at 59.
128. See Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1990).
129. WITKIN, Attorneys, supra note 98, § 476.
130. CALIFORNIA LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 71.
131. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6076.5 (West 2007).
132. In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d 49, 54 (Cal. 1998); see CAL. CONST. art. VI, §
1.
133. In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d at 54. "Admission to the bar is a judicial
function, and members of the bar are officers of the court, subject to discipline by the court.
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this power belongs to the supreme court, the legislature manages
attorney conduct through the Act.'34 One of the Act's functions is
regulating behavior "which would constitute the unauthorized
practice of law if performed by a layman."' 35 The Act defines the
duties of an attorney,'3 6 among them the duty of confidentiality.'37
Additionally, the Act includes provisions that govern fee agreements
and advertising, the violation of which could lead to discipline.'38
Sections like these equate to direct regulation of attorney conduct by
the legislature."'
While the Act provoked immediate controversy, the California
Supreme Court upheld it in State Bar of California v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles County.4 ° The court noted that attorneys constitute
the largest and most influential group of professionals in
California. 4 ' As officers of the courts, attorneys have a duty both to
promote the administration of justice and to serve the public at
"'
large. 42
Because being a lawyer is a prerequisite to becoming a
judge, however, the court implied that it was necessary to have
another branch keep watch over the judiciary."'

Hence, under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, the court has inherent and
primary regulatory power [over admission to practice law]." Id. (citations omitted); WITKIN,
Attorneys, supra note 98, § 356, at 438.
134. Doskow, EthicsRules in Flux, supra note 103.
135. Baron v. City of L.A., 469 P.2d 353, 358 (Cal. 1970). Given the widespread abuse of the
"attorney at law" title, it is logical that the 1927 Act sought to exclude laymen from practice. See
GILB, supra note 122, at 36-37.
136. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (West 2007).
137. Id. § 6068(e). As noted infra Part Il.B, the duty of confidentiality is a key component of
an attorney's fiduciary relationship to her client. Consistent with the State Bar Act's goals,
confidentiality is one of the duties that sets a bar member apart from other holders of Juris Doctor
degrees. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6067. "Every person on his admission shall take an
oath.., and faithfully to discharge the duties of any attorney at law .
I..."
Id.
138. Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 103.
139. Id.
140. State Bar v. Superior Court, 278 P. 432, 439 (Cal. 1929).
141. Id. at435.
142. Id. at 435. Arguably, an attorney's duty to the public is greater than her duty to the
court. See Bradley R. Kirk, Note, Milking the New Sacred Cow: The Supreme Court Limits the
Peremptory Challenge on Racial Grounds in Powers v. Ohio and Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 19 PEPP. L. REv. 691, 722 n.267 (1992) (discussing State Bar v. Superior Court,
278 P. at 435).
143. State Bar v. Superior Court, 278 P. at 435. "From almost the inception of our state
government statutory provision has been made for the admission, disbarment, suspension, or
disciplining of members of the legal profession." Id.
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[Society] is to be safeguarded against the ignorances or evil
dispositions of those who may be masquerading beneath the
cloak of the legal and supposedly learned and upright
profession. It is to be noted also that from the body of the
legal profession it is required ... the justices and judges of
all courts of record and of certain other subordinate
tribunals must be chosen."'
In the court's opinion, fear of attorney omnipotence justified
legislative oversight of professional conduct.1 45 Consistent with this
decision, the California Supreme Court has never held that the Act's
provisions regulating attorney conduct are an unconstitutional
6
1 4
exercise of legislative authority.
To protect the public, the legislature is authorized under its
47
police power to create laws that govern the practice of law.
Similarly, the California Supreme Court seeks to protect the public
through the Rules of Professional Conduct and its own disciplinary
authority. 148 The supreme court enacts the Rules to set standards
based on the court's perception of what constitutes appropriate legal
practice.149 When attorneys fail to comply with these standards,
members of the public can vindicate their rights by reporting the
misconduct to the state bar. 5 ' Therefore, the supreme court's and the
legislature's goals dovetail with respect to attorney discipline. While
the legislature must protect the public welfare, 51 the court must be
vigilant to ensure the reliability of the system it oversees.152

144. Id. at 435.
145. See Hustedt v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 636 P.2d 1139, 1143 n.7 (Cal. 1981).
146. Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 103; see, e.g., Lebbos v. State Bar, 806 P.2d 317, 323,
(Cal. 1991) (indicating that the State Bar Act is not "an unconstitutional delegation of judicial
power to the State Bar" because the California Supreme Court retains the ability to discipline
attorneys).
147. In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d 49, 61 (Cal. 1998); Hustedt, 636 P.2d at 1143.
148. CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1-100; see Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 162 (Cal.
1993) (quoting Ames v. State Bar, 506 P.2d 625, 629 (Cal. 1973)).
149. See CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1-100 (stating that the Rules are designed "to protect the
public and to promote respect and confidence in the legal profession").
150. See, e.g., State Bar of California, The State Bar of California: What Does It Do? How
Does it Work?, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/whowhatI.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2008).
151. In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d 49, 61 (Cal. 1998).
152. SeelnreLavine,41 P.2d 161, 162 (Cal. 1935).
[T]he right to practice law not only presupposes in its possessor integrity, legal standing, and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature
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2. The Practical Effect of This Shared Power
Although in theory the legislature and the supreme court both
enjoy power over the duty of confidentiality, in practice, the
legislature's role overshadows that of the supreme court because the
duty has always been enshrined in statute.'53 An example of this
dynamic is the story of how Rule of Professional Conduct 3-100
came into existence.
Before 1987, there was no mention of the duty of confidentiality
in the Rules.'54 In 1987, the state bar first proposed that the supreme
court adopt Rule 3-100, which would borrow section 6068(e)'s
concept of confidentiality and include five express exceptions to the
"'
duty. 55
The proposed Rule defined the terms "confidence" and
"secrets" to clarify potentially ambiguous language in section
6068(e).'56
In declining to adopt this new Rule, the court did not provide its
reasons.57 In a letter to the president of the state bar, however, the
court "suggested that if the rule was intended to permit disclosure in
a proceeding where the attorney-client evidentiary privilege attached,
the supreme court might not have the authority to approve such a
rule."' 58 As such, it appears that the court feared intruding on the
legislature's jurisdiction by creating an exception to the duty of
confidentiality without a corresponding evidentiary exception to the
attorney-client privilege."'
In 1992, the state bar again submitted a proposed rule to the
supreme court that defined the duty of confidentiality but proposed
only one exception to it. 60 The exception was limited to preventing
of a public trust, the granting of which privilege to an individual is everywhere conceded to be the
exercise of ajudicial function (citations omitted). Id.
153. See Mohr, supra note 97, at 366.
154. See CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT ch. 3, available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/
calbargeneric.jspcid=10158&id=3502. Until 2003, when Rule 3-100 was enacted, the Rules
did not mention the duty of confidentiality. See Doskow, Ethics Rules In Flux, supra note 103
(discussing other characteristics particular to California's system of attorney regulation).
155. Mohr, supra note 97, at 369-70.
156. Id. at 369 n.240.
157. Id. at 372.
158. Id. at 370 n.241.
159. Id. at 374-75. Note that the attorney-client privilege is narrower than the duty of
confidentiality; so to create an exception to the larger duty of confidentiality would undermine the
legislature's power over the attorney-client privilege. See supra Part IlI.B.
160. Mohr, supra note 97, at 370-71.
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criminal acts that could result in serious bodily injury.' 6 ' This
version also included a "safe harbor," whereby a lawyer who
disclosed client information under the applicable exception would
not be subject to discipline by the bar.'62 The supreme court again
rejected this suggestion without explanation.'63
In 1998, the state bar proposed a third version of rule 3-100 that
again included an exception for criminal acts that might result in
substantial bodily harm."6 This version abandoned the "safe harbor"
provision"' but suffered the same fate as its predecessors, receiving
66
another curt denial. 1
A few years later, in response to the Ossias affair, the bar tried
to provide guidance for future whistleblowers by clarifying the
relationship of a government attorney to her client.'67 In denying the
bar's request, the court became slightly more generous by providing
a one-sentence reason for rejecting the Rule, citing a conflict with the
provisions of section 6068(e) of the Business and Professions
Code.

168

It was only after the legislature in 2003 passed Code section
6068(e)(2), 169 the criminal act exception to the duty of
confidentiality, that the supreme court was willing to approve a Rule
that mentioned the duty of confidentiality. 7 ° The current version of
Rule 3-100 merely refers to the duty mentioned in section 6068(e)(1)
and explains how to implement the exception in section
6068(e)(2).'7
With the help of the bar's input and proposals, the court has had
ample opportunities to clarify the scope of the duty and adopt
161. Id.
162. Id. at 371.
163. Id. at 370-71.
164. Id. at 371.
165. Id. at 371 n.246.
166. Id. at 371-72.
167. See supra Part I.B.
168. In re Adoption of Amendments to Rule 3-600 of the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, No.
S 104682, (Cal. May 10, 2002) (on file with the state bar) ("[The request to amend Rule 3-600] is
denied because the proposed modifications conflict with Business and Professions Code section
6068, subdivision (e)."); see also DeBenedictis, supra note 61.
169. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)(2) (West 2007).
170. See John W. Amberg & Jon L. Rewinski, 2004 Ethics Roundup, L.A. LAW., June 2005,
at 27-28.
171. CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3-100.
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appropriate exceptions. However, the court has rebuffed the legal
community's repeated attempts to refine the duty of confidentiality.
In the future, the supreme court should at least provide its reasons for
declining to adopt Rules, if for no other reason than to inform the
state bar of which proposed modifications might be acceptable.
In light of the supreme court's reference to 6068(e) when
rejecting proposed Rule 3-600 and the fact that the court changed the
Rules only after the legislature had enacted the statutory exception to
the duty of confidentiality, it appears that the supreme court has been
hesitant to even consider modifying the duty for fear of stepping on
the legislature's toes.'72 However, the duty of confidentiality is an
important component of the legal system and therefore falls within
the supreme court's jurisdiction. The supreme court's reluctant
approach to adopting rules that deal with confidentiality has allowed
the legislature to "defeat or materially impair the exercise of [the
supreme court's] functions."'7 3 Therefore, keeping the duty of
confidentiality in the Business and Professions Code would further
prevent the supreme court from exercising its due power over the
duty of confidentiality.
B. If Immunity Is Uncertain,Few Will Dare to Speak Out
When there is a conflict between an attorney's mandatory duty
of confidentiality and optional whistleblower statutes, the state bar is
forced to bring disciplinary action against a government attorney
who blows the whistle.'74 If the bar instead chooses to favor
transparency policies by ignoring the plain language of the ethics
provisions, its enforcement procedures appear subjective and
arbitrary. On one hand, any appearance of inconsistent application
of the rules undermines the credibility of the bar. On the other,
otherwise innocent attorneys who perform a valuable public service
might lose their livelihoods, despite statutory language that
encourages them to speak out.

172. Mohr, supra note 97, at 379. "Those rejections probably do not reflect a deep-seated
antipathy . . . on the court's part to exceptions to the duty of confidentiality. Rather, they more
likely evince the court's belief that it does not have the authority to upend the absolute language"
of section 6068(e), independent of the existence of the exceptions to the attorney-client privilege
in the Evidence Code. Id. at 378-79.
173. Brydonjack v. State Bar, 281 P. 1018, 1020 (Cal. 1929).
174. Attorney General, supra note 54.
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The way in which the bar handled the Ossias investigation
illustrates the community's inclination to protect government
attorney whistleblowing in spite of clear statutory language to the
contrary.1 75 After initiating an investigation into Ossias's disclosures,
the California Bar's Office of Trial Counsel communicated to
Ossias's attorney its decision to discontinue the investigation. 76 The
deputy trial counsel declined to analyze whether the Department of
Insurance was Ossias's client or whether she had breached her duty
of confidentiality by providing documents to legislative
committees.'
Instead, Ossias was not disciplined because her
conduct "(1) ... was consistent with the spirit of the Whistleblower
Protection Act; (2) . . . advanced important public policy

considerations bearing on the responsibilities of the office of
insurance commissioner; and (3) [was] not otherwise subject to
prosecution under the guidelines set forth in this office's Statement
of Disciplinary Priorities."'7
The bar's letter does not adequately explain its decision because
there is no discussion of how Ossias's actions apply to the legal
framework governing attorney discipline.
Instead of directly
attacking the issues, the letter presented flimsy reasons for ending the
investigation. Although this approach was beneficial to Ossias, it
provides no indication of how the bar will approach future
79
whistleblowers.1

The first reason for exonerating Ossias-that she acted in the
"spirit" of the Whistleblower Act-was not at issue.'80 Rather, the
bar was tasked with deciding whether she had violated her duty
under the provisions regulating attorney conduct.'
The second
reason-that her behavior promoted the department's public policy
considerations-essentially means that her "conduct assisted her

175. Steedman Letter, supra note 22.
176. Id.
177. Doskow, Two-Year Journey to Nowhere, supra note 54, at 42-43 (2003); see Steedman
Letter, supra note 22.
178. Steedman Letter, supra note 22.
179. ZITRIN AND LANGFORD, supra note 15, at 552.
180. Indeed, the whistleblower laws make no mention of immunity from state bar disciplinary
action. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 8547-8548.5 (West 2007); Doskow, Two Year Journey to
Nowhere, supra note 54, at 41.
181. See Doskow, Two Year Journey to Nowhere, supra note 54, at 41.
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client, the Department of Insurance, in doing its job."'' 2 Public
policy is not an excuse for violating an attorney's ethical
obligations." 3 The third and final reason-that the behavior was "not
otherwise subject to prosecution" 184-- was actually an exercise in
prosecutorial discretion. 85 In reality, the state bar was attempting to
appease the many bar members, public, and legislature who firmly
86
supported Ossias' actions.1
Since Ossias was a likeable whistleblower, her actions were
widely publicized, and Quackenbush's behavior was so egregious,
the bar had little choice but to bow to the pressures of public opinion
and discontinue the investigation. 7 In failing to discuss whether
Ossias had complied with the statutes, the bar perhaps recognized
that it was not in a position to fashion its own exception to the duty
of confidentiality. The letter is of little use to attorneys faced with a
similar situation.'88 Furthermore, the bar explicitly stated that the
letter contained no public policy implications.'89
At the very least, in Ossias's case, the bar was reluctant to allow
the stringent duty of confidentiality to override the whistleblower
policies, meaning that the duty of confidentiality may not be as
absolute as it seems. Depending on the egregiousness of the act that
the whistleblower reveals, the disciplinary arm of the bar might be
willing to look the other way. 9 ° This ad-hoc approach creates
uncertainty for government attorneys.
They are unable to
realistically assess the risks and benefits of disclosure because they
do not know whether they will be disciplined or if so, to what
extent. 9 ' If an attorney is not sure whether it is safe to speak out, she
will likely choose to be silent. There is a public cost to silence: a
watered-down approach to government transparency.

182. Id.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See id.
Steedman Letter, supra note 22.
Doskow, Two-Year Journey to Nowhere, supra note 54, at 41.
Id. at40--41.
Id.
ZITRIN AND LANGFORD, supra note 15, at 552.
Steedman Letter, supra note 22.
See Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 103, at 23.
Id.
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Some might argue that the duty of confidentiality should always
be favored over transparency policies, even in the case of
government attorneys. A stringent duty of confidentiality is an
Although this is true,
essential aspect of the legal system.19
government attorneys are in a unique position. Like their fellow civil
servants, they are repositories of public trust and are paid out of tax
money to serve the public. To allow civil servants to use a
government attorney's services to commit a fraud on the public does
not enrich society. Public officials cannot expect the same level of
confidentiality as a private client.193
In sum, the combination of ethics provisions and whistleblower
statutes does little to support the important public policy of
transparency. Where the conditions are right, there may be future
cases that warrant breaching the duty of confidentiality. Creating a
narrowly tailored standard to guide future government-attorney
whistleblowers would not erode all confidentiality. While the
provisions of a possible exception to the duty of confidentiality for
government attorneys are beyond the scope of this Note, a change in
the structure of the duty of confidentiality could make the system
more amenable to adopting important policy proposals.' 94
C. "Government as Client" Is Not
Equivalent to "OrganizationAs Client"
The tension between the competing obligations of transparency
and confidentiality is exacerbated by the fact that the government
attorney is representing an organizational client with a nontraditional power structure. Rule of Professional Conduct 3-600
defines the "client" of an attorney that represents an organization.'95
The rule, however, fails to take into account the unique situation of
government attorneys. First, and most importantly, it is not clear to
whom a public attorney owes a duty of confidentiality. 9 6 Second,
the rule's procedure for reporting harmful behavior is unhelpful to a

192.
1999).
193.
194.
195.
196.

People ex rel. Dep't of Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 378 (Cal.
See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
See infra Part V.A.1.
CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3-600 ("Organization as Client").
COPRAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 14.
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and a
government attorney because a public entity has different goals 197
more complex organizational structure than a private company.
1. The Structure and Content of Rule 3-600
Rule 3-600 defines an organizational client as the entity itself,
acting through the highest authorized agent. 98 Where an employee
acts in a manner that could injure the organization, the attorney is
prohibited from breaching her duty of confidentiality under
California Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). 9 9 In this
situation, the attorney has three possible options: (1) to urge
reconsideration;2 °0 (2) to report the issue to a higher internal
authority, or if necessary, to the highest person who is authorized to
represent the organization;20 ' or (3) to discontinue the representation
in accordance with the mandatory resignation procedures listed in
Rule 3-700.202
Furthermore, when the officers, directors, shareholders, or
employees' interests conflict with the organization's interests, the
attorney is expected to explain that she is representing the entire
organization, not them as individuals. 2 3 The lawyer "should not be
2°
influenced by the personal desires of any person or organization"
because the only client is the "corporate entity actually
represented. 20 5
2. The Rule's Definition of "Client"
Does Not Apply to Government Entities
The central problem with this rule is that it fails to take into
account the unique nature of a government "client. 20 6 The rule
designates "client" as "the organization itself, acting through the
197. See Richard C. Solomon, Wearing Many Hats: Confidentiality and Conflicts of Interest
Issuesfor the CaliforniaPublic Lawyer, 25 Sw. U. L. REv 265, 295-96 (1996).
198. CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3-600(A).
199. Id.3-600(B).
200. Id. 3-600(B)(1).
201. Id. 3-600(B)(2).
202. Id. 3-600(C).
203. See id. 3-600(D); Cal. State Bar Comm. Prof'l Responsibility, Op. 1989-113 (1989).
204. Cal. State Bar Comm. ProfI Responsibility, Op. 1989-113 (1989) (citing MODEL CODE
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-18).
205. Id.
206. See COPRAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 4.

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:701

highest authorized officer, employee, body, or constituent overseeing
the particular engagement.""2 7 In a non-governmental corporation,
this "client" is clearly identifiable because there is often a hierarchy
of power and a formal procedure for decision making. In the
government context, however, this concept of "highest authorized
officer"2 °8 is ambiguous because there are many potential
stakeholders who have "authority" to make decisions for the
organization, and it may be difficult to prioritize who is the "highest"
in command. 0 9 For example, the legislature may allocate funding
and regulate the organizational structure while the executive branch
appoints an agency director."
This multi-layered approach to
administrating a governmental organization makes it unclear who has
the ultimate responsibility for the organization.2"' Without that
information, the attorney cannot know to whom she owes the duty of
confidentiality.
3. The Rule's Contemplated Reporting Scheme
Does Not Apply to Government Organizations
Rule 3-600 describes the steps an attorney can take to report
wrongdoing to the "highest internal authority that can act on behalf
'
of the organization."212
However, this scheme does not make sense
in the government context. First, the organizational harm described
in the rule does not reflect the concerns of a governmental
organization. Second, the lack of a definition of the "client" means
that the attorney does not know to whom she is authorized to report
this harm.
The type of harm a governmental organization may suffer is
different from the rule's contemplated harms.
For this reason, a
government attorney might not be able to determine which types of
207. CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3-600(A).
208. Id.
209. See generallyWitkowski, supra note 72 (describing the role of government lawyers).
210. See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE (West 2007) (illustrating ways in which the
legislature controls organizational structure).
211. Attorney General, supra note 54, at 73 (speculating about who is the "client" of an
attorney representing the Medical Board of California: "the board itself, its executive director, the
Department of Consumer Affairs of which the board is a part, the State and Consumer Services
Agency in which the department is situated, or possibly someone else such as the Governor?").
212. CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3-600(B)(2).
213. See Solomon, supra note 197, at 295; see also COPRAC REPORT supra note 7, at 15.
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activities merit reporting. The rule recognizes two types of harm: (1)
"a violation of law reasonably imputable to the organization;" and
(2) behavior "which is likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization. '2 41 Since government organizations are not motivated
by profit, the types of "injury" a government organization could
suffer are inherently different from those of a regular corporation.
While corporations are vulnerable to losing profitability or customer
good-will if an employee is corrupt, a government organization will
not be shut down because of a few bad eggs. 215 The government
entity may risk public distrust; however, its ability to exist will not
be threatened in the same way that a corporation would." 6 Because
this concept of "harm" to a government organization is so
ambiguous, it is also subjective and difficult to identify. Therefore,
the current language of Rule 3-600 that authorizes an attorney to
report "harmful" activities does not provide sufficient guidance to
government attorneys.
Moreover, if a government attorney feels compelled to report
wrongdoing, Rule 3-600's reporting scheme would be ineffective.
Determining who is the "highest internal authority 217 to whom the
attorney may report is difficult in the government context because
"highest" and "internal" are open to interpretation unless they are
specifically defined. For example, Cindy Ossias believed that the
public was her client, in particular because the mission of the CDI is
to protect consumers. 218 Depending on how one chooses to identify
the government client, the "highest internal authority" could be the
director of the agency, the legislative subcommittee that oversees the
agency, the speaker of the assembly, or the governor.2"9 Since
government attorneys currently have no guidance on the identity of
their "client," they do not know to whom they owe a duty of
confidentiality and, therefore, must guess as to how they can safely
report organizational wrongdoing.

214. CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3-600(B).
215. See Solomon, supra note 197, at 296.
216.
217.
218.
Loyola
219.

Id. at 296-97.
CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3-600(B)(2).
E-mail from Cindy Ossias, Senior Staff Counsel, Cal. Dep't of Ins., to Jessica Shpall,
Law Sch. (Jan. 14, 2008, 10:54:00 PST) (on file with author).
See Witkowski, supra note 72.
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V. PROPOSAL

As illustrated above, the current legal framework makes it
difficult for government attorneys to reconcile these competing
policies. This Note proposes two solutions to the challenges
discussed above. First, the bar should propose that the regulations
outlining an attorney's duty of confidentiality be moved from the
California Business and Professions Code to the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Second, the bar should identify the client of
an attorney representing a governmental organization and
incorporate this new definition into a separate rule. ° While these
solutions are independent of each other, both should be adopted. If
that is not possible, however, implementing either alternative could
significantly improve the current situation. In outlining the benefits
of these potential changes, this Part will explain how the proposals
address the problems with the current legal framework, consider
limitations to the proposals, and explore how to overcome these
limitations.
A. Transfer the Duty of Confidentiality to the
Rules of ProfessionalConduct
1. Proposal
The regulations outlining an attorney's duty of confidentiality
should be moved from the California Business and Professions Code
to the Rules of Professional Conduct because doing so would strike
the appropriate constitutional balance between the supreme court's
concern for the legal system and the legislature's desire to protect the
public. As noted, the supreme court has rebuffed all efforts by the
bar to modify the duty of confidentiality, apparently because the
court believes it is powerless to do so as long as the duty is
" ' This stance by the court
codified.22
does a disservice to the legal
system because the bar and the supreme court are in the best position
to shape the duty of confidentiality.
First, the supreme court has the inherent power to regulate
attorneys.2 As noted above, the legislature is allowed to share this
220. Another option is to simply change the language of Rule 3-600 to reflect the needs of
government attorneys; however, adopting a new Rule would be more user-friendly.
221. See supra Part IV.A.2.
222. See, e.g., In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d 49, 55 (Cal. 1998).
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power subject to certain limits.122 In the past, when the supreme
court perceived that the legislature was preventing it from exercising
this power over the legal system, the court reasserted its right to act
unilaterally. 224 For example, the legislature typically designates how
much the bar can collect in dues, although the bar functions as an
arm of the supreme court. 25 In 1997, however, Governor Pete
Wilson vetoed a bill which would have enabled the bar to collect
yearly dues of $458.00, and the bar's disciplinary system became
severely backlogged due to lack of funding. 26 Since the disciplinary
system is the court's mechanism for ensuring good attorney conduct,
the court held that it was necessary to impose the fees.227
Similarly, the court's reticence to change the Rules of
Professional Conduct for fear of affecting the statutory duty of
confidentiality 28 has allowed the legislature to "defeat or materially
'
impair the exercise of these functions."229
The primary purpose23 ° of
the duty of confidentiality is to strengthen the legal system 3 and the
duty is an essential component of the court's power to regulate
attorney conduct. 23 2 Therefore, the court should follow its reasoning
from In Re Attorney Discipline System233 by reasserting its power

over the duty of confidentiality.
Second, the bar and its respective committees are in the best
position to study the dynamics of the duty of confidentiality.
223. See id. at 56 (discussing the legislature's authority to collect and appropriate the revenue
of the State).
224. See, e.g., id. at 49 (upholding the court's power to set bar dues after the legislature had
failed to do so); Hustedt v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 636 P.2d 1139 (Cal. 1981) (holding
that the legislature, in authorizing the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board to discipline an
attorney, had undermined the court's jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings); Merco Const.
Eng'rs, Inc. v. Municipal Court, 581 P.2d 636 (1978) (holding that the legislature, by allowing a
corporate officer who was not an attorney to appear in a civil action, usurped the court's power to
authorize admission to practice law).
225. In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d at 52.
226. Id. at 53.
227. Id. at 52.
228. See supra Part IV.A.2.
229. Brydonjack v. State Bar, 281 P. 1018, 1020 (Cal. 1929).
230. Although the duty also seeks to protect the public from harm, its main purpose is to
enable clients to rely on their attorneys, thereby ensuring that clients make use of the legal
system. See supra Part III.B.
231. See supra Part IV.2.
232. People ex rel. Dep't of Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 378 (Cal.
1999).
233. In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d 49, 55 (Cal. 1998).
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Because the bar234 spends the bulk of its time and energy evaluating
whether a particular attorney's behavior complies with the
disciplinary rules, 35 it is familiar with the pitfalls of the current
ethics provisions and is in a position to suggest potential revisions.
Furthermore, the bar has subcommittees staffed with ethics experts
who are tasked with researching the Rules of Professional
Conduct.236
For example, the principal focus of the bar's
Commission for the Revision of the Rules is to stay abreast of
developments in the field of professional responsibility.237 If the duty
of confidentiality were exclusively in the Rules, the bar's
recommended modifications to the duty would not fall on deaf ears,
as they sometimes have in the past. Instead, the bar's suggested
changes would have a better chance of being implemented. Further,
any changes to the duty of confidentiality would be grounded in a
careful study of the current trends in legal ethics.
Third, housing the duty of confidentiality in the Rules of
Professional Conduct would provide greater flexibility for
modification without eroding the duty because the court is less
swayed by political currents and can act independently of other
branches."' Since the legislative process requires continuous
negotiation between political parties, the legislature is "probably
more susceptible than the court to the pressures of various interested
parties, and the compromises that likely would ensue might weaken
'
the proposed legislation."239
Although such negotiations might be
appropriate for other matters, such as fee arrangements and
advertising regulations, the duty of confidentiality is essential to the
attorney-client relationship.2 4' The supreme court, therefore, is best

234. And, to a lesser degree, the court.
235. In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d at 58-59 (noting that the state bar assists the
court in disciplining attorneys).
236. Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct, http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/
calbargeneric.jsp?cid=10130&id=l104 (last visited Jan. 13, 2008) [hereinafter COPRAC
Introduction].
237. See Charter of the Comm. for the Revision of the Rules of Prof'I Conduct, available at
http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar-generic.jspcid=10129 (last visited Jan. 13, 2008).
Among the Committees goals are "eliminating ambiguities" and "fostering the evolution of a
national standard with respect to professional responsibility issues." Id.
238. Mohr, supra note 97, at 383.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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positioned to oversee the duty because it would be able to
independently evaluate the merits of a proposed change.
Although the court does not face the same political pressure as
the legislature, there are important checks on its power to regulate
attorney conduct. First, unlike federal Supreme Court justices,
California Supreme Court justices do not enjoy life tenure; rather,
they are re-elected every twelve years.24 ' Although twelve years may
be a long time for a constituent to remember a justice's controversial
decision, the justices are still subject to some degree of
accountability. Moreover, the court and the bar are both "sensitive to
' and therefore unlikely to make
the concerns of their constituents"242
any drastic changes to the duty of confidentiality. The bar's policy
of soliciting public comment on proposed rules seeks to incorporate
the views of the public at large and the many stakeholders within the
bar.243 As a result of this process, the bar has even revised and
withdrawn proposed rules.2" This respect for the legal community's
input, as well as the fact that the justices have to earn their reelection, will keep the court from unduly modifying the duty of
confidentiality.
Finally, moving the duty to the Rules of Professional Conduct
would not erode California's strict duty of confidentiality.245 The
court has a strong record of protecting the attorney-client
relationship.246 Moreover, the bar carefully guards its own interests
with respect to the duty of confidentiality. For example, the bar
opposed Assemblywoman Pavley's 2006 bill because it feared that
the duty of confidentiality was being threatened.247 The court and
bar's combined commitment to confidentiality is grounded in a
241. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16; Mohr, supra note 97, at 383.
242. Mohr, supra note 97, at 383.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 384.
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 503 (Cal. 1994); see
also People ex rel. Dep't of Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 378 (Cal.

1999).
247. Huber, supra note 67. Additionally, the California State Bar has aggressively opposed
the Sarbanes-Oxley rules that create new exceptions to the duty of confidentiality. See generally
Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual Fault Line in the
Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1089, 1126-36 (2006)
(discussing the duty of confidentiality and the bar's reaction to amendments to the Rules and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
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2 48
desire and responsibility to ensure the integrity of the legal system.
Moving the duty of confidentiality to the rules would not decrease its
effectiveness because the court understands that it is essential for
clients to trust their attorneys with sensitive information.249

2. Addressing the Limitations of This Proposal
A limitation of this proposal is the fact that the legislature has
presided over the duty of confidentiality for more than 130 years.250
This proposal would require all three branches of government to
agree that this long-held tradition is worth changing.251 Although the
statutory duty is deeply entrenched in California's legal history,
transferring the duty to the Rules of Professional Conduct would
strengthen the attorney-client relationship by allowing the legislature
and the supreme court to share power over this issue.
First, the legislature would retain some degree of control over
attorney confidentiality.25 2
The attorney-client privilege, an
important subset of the concept of client confidentiality, would
remain under the legislature's control.253 The supreme court has
consistently upheld the legislature's role in this evidentiary
context. 54
Second, the legislature's goal in regulating the duty of
confidentiality is to protect the public through its police powers.255
Since the supreme court shares this desire to protect the public,
however, transferring the duty to the Rules would not minimize this
concern. Rather, making this proposed change would ensure that the
supreme court's interests are also being addressed.
Finally, this idea is neither radical nor novel. The state bars and
supreme courts of every state other than California oversee the duty

248. See supra Part VA. 1.
249. SpeeDee Oil, 980 P.2d at 378. "The paramount concern must be to preserve public trust
in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar." Id.
250. Mohr, supra note 97, at 366, 385.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at385.
Id.
Id. (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 911 (1995)).
Id. (citing Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 504 (Cal. 1994)).
See supra Part IV.A. 1.
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of confidentiality. 256 In joining the rest of the country, California
would not be relinquishing or watering down its unique views on
confidentiality. 257 Rather, the bar would be able to freely debate the
issue without having to worry about persuading the legislature.25
Moreover, it is possible that the bar would support this transfer. In
the wake of the Ossias affair, COPRAC considered transferring the
section 6068(e) duty of confidentiality to a new rule but abandoned
the idea due to time constraints and other priorities. 259 Now that the
court has denied COPRAC's request to change Rule 3-600 and
history has shown the political challenges of modifying the statutory
duty,26° the bar should propose that the duty of confidentiality be
transferred to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
B. Create a New Rule ofProfessionalConduct that Identifies
Whom the GovernmentAttorney Is Representing and
When to Report Wrongdoing to This "Client"
1.Proposal
This proposal calls on the bar to promulgate a new Rule of
Professional Conduct that addresses the attorney-client relationship
in the government context. As noted, the language of Rule 3-600
does not apply to the unique situation of government attorneys.26'
Most importantly, the bar should identify the government attorney's
client and delineate an appropriate reporting scheme for informing
that "client" of wrongdoing within the organization. Because
changes to the language of Rule 3-600 would be comprehensive, the
bar should adopt a new rule that specifically addresses attorneyThis proposal should be
client issues in the government.

256. See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT AND OTHER SELECTED STANDARDS, INCLUDING CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK RULES
ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, App. A (2004).

257. Bost, supra note 247, at 1126-36 (discussing California's unique approach to rules of
confidentiality).
258. See Huber, supra note 67, at 904-05 (discussing the bar's efforts to lobby the assembly).
259. COPRAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 20-21. In the wake of the Quackenbush scandal,
COPRAC considered transferring the duty of confidentiality from section 6068(e) to a new Rule
3-100. Id.
260. See supra Part IV.A.2.
261. See supra Part IV.C.2.
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implemented regardless of whether the duty of confidentiality is
transferred to the Rules of Professional Conduct.262
a. Identify whom a government attorney represents
Rule 3-600 identifies the nature of the relationship between an
attorney and her client."' Where a client is an organization, the rule
identifies to whom the attorney owes allegiance.2" The bar and
supreme court are the only entities that should have the power to
define the attorney-client relationship.
The court has the
constitutional power to regulate attorney conduct.2 65 The bar has
expertise in understanding the issues that affect attorneys and clients
in conflict. 66 The fact that there is no equivalent statute in the
Business and Professions Code reflects the traditional roles of the
court and bar as the appropriate entities to define this relationship.
This proposal differs significantly from COPRAC's
unsuccessful attempt to modify Rule 3-600 in 2002.267 First,
COPRAC's proposed rule, although it purported to clarify "who is"
the government attorney's client, did not specifically identify the
governmental client because COPRAC recognized that an attorney's
client may vary from case to case.268 In other words, COPRAC noted
the complexity of deciding who the client is but declined to answer
the question.
Second, COPRAC's suggestion, in reality, seemed to override
the statutory duty of confidentiality or, at least, call it into question
by creating a proposed safe-harbor provision. 269 The proposed rule
262. See COPRAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 21. "We never viewed a new rule 3-100 as
necessary to adopt our recommended changes to rule 3-600." Id.
263. See CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3-600.
264. See id. 3-600(D).
265. See, e.g., In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d 49, 55 (Cal. 1998).
266. See COPRAC Introduction, supra note 236.
267. See supra Part II.B.
268. COPRAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 30-32. "On the other hand, when a member
represents a state agency, the client generally will be the agency itself, but under certain
circumstances, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the
government as a whole." OFFICES OF PROF'L COMPETENCE & GEN. COUNSEL OF THE STATE
BAR OF CAL., REQUEST THAT THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA APPROVE AMENDMENTS TO
RULE 3-600 OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
AND MEMORANDUM AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS IN EXPLANATION, enclosure 1 (2002),

available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/rule3-600request.pdf (discussing proposed
Rule 3-600).
269. OFFICES OF PROF'L COMPETENCE & GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 268, at Enclosure 1.
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contemplated a system for reporting within the agency. 70 If such a
reporting scheme failed and certain conditions were met, a
government attorney:
would act consistently with his or her duty of protecting any
confidential information as provided in Business and
Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) by referring
the matter to the law enforcement agency charged with
responsibility over the matter or to any other governmental
agency or official charged with overseeing or regulating the
matter

271

Accordingly, the proposed rule purported to interpret section 6068(e)
as allowing government attorneys to report wrongdoing to oversight
agencies. If this rule had defined "client" as a law enforcement or
oversight agency, then this reporting scheme would have complied
with the requirements of the statutory duty of confidentiality.
Without a specific description of the "client," however, the proposed
rule potentially allowed an attorney to breach the statutory duty of
confidentiality. COPRAC itself recognized that "[a]lthough the
Supreme Court can provide a safe harbor from discipline for
violation of the rules it has adopted, there is a question whether it can
provide a safe harbor for a lawyer who violates a provision of the
'
State Bar Act."272
Consequently, the supreme court perceived that
the proposed rule unduly intervened with the legislature's
jurisdiction and denied the request.273
In contrast, the present proposal is limited to requesting that the
bar propose a rule that truly identifies the government "client" and
the proper means of reporting wrongdoing within the client entity.
Instead of taking the drastic step of providing a safe harbor for
attorneys to report wrongdoing outside of the client entity, which
could again be perceived as interfering with the statute, the bar
should instead focus on defining the attorney-client relationship to
notify attorneys of the boundaries of their representation of the
government client.

270. Id.
271. Id.
272. COPRAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 18.
273. In re Adoption of Amendments to Rule 3-600 of the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, No.
S 106482 (Cal. 2002) (on file with the state bar).
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To determine whom a government attorney represents, the bar

will need to evaluate the existing theories and determine which best
applies. Designating which model the bar should choose is beyond

the scope of this Note.
However, numerous scholars have
identity of a government client. 74
the
on
debate
the
to
contributed
Given that there are so many permutations of the government
attorney-client relationship within the structure of the government,275

the bar may have to identify several models of representation and
create a catchall category for attorneys in non-traditional roles.
b. Create a separaterule ofprofessionalconduct
that incorporatesthis new description of the
attorney-government client relationship

The bar should create a new rule specifically addressing the
nuances of the attorney-client relationship in the government
context. 6 Because the current rule fails to consider not only whom a

government attorney represents but also how to report wrongdoing to
' adopting a new rule would be less confusing than
that "client,"277
separating each sub-section of Rule 3-600 into "governmental

organization" and "non-governmental organization." Moreover, if
the bar decides to designate several models for different government
attorneys to identify their client, it might be simpler just to have a
separate rule. While this is the preferred method, the bar should at
least change the language of Rule 3-600, as discussed above, if it
chooses not to adopt a new rule.

274. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the
Government Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 296 (1991); Robert P. Lawry, Confidences
and the Government Lawyer, 57 N.C. L. Rev. 625 (1979); Solomon, supra note 197, at 298-312;
Witkowski, supra note 72, at 154-68.
275. See Witkowski, supra note 72, at 124-26. Witkowski identifies three examples where
the question of "who is the client" arises. Id. First, where an Assistant Attorney General is
tasked with litigating an issue for another government agency, yet believes the case should be
settled. Id. Second, where several agencies within the same branch of government participate in
negotiations and the attorneys are working together despite potentially adverse interests. Id.
Third, where a city attorney is assigned to represent the mayor charged with corruption and feels
that there is a conflict of interest because she is "obligated to represent the interests of the
government and the public." Id.
276. This new Rule could be entitled "Governmental Organization as Client."
277. See supra Part IV.C.
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2. Addressing the Limitations of This Proposal
Identifying who exactly is the government client will be a
challenging task for the bar. However, leaving this inquiry
unanswered will keep government attorneys unsure of the nature of
their relationship with their "client." Without clear guidance, an
attorney who witnesses wrongdoing will be placed in the
uncomfortable position of trying to determine to whom she owes a
duty of confidentiality."' The bar, with its many resources, should
be able to answer this question. Finding the right approach to the
issue of the identity of a government client may require several
attempts and extensive input from the community; however, this
inquiry is an essential task. Currently, a government attorney who
does know whom she represents could be exposed to investigation by
the bar if she chooses to report wrongdoing. Worse yet, she might
decide not to report it at all, to the detriment of the citizens of
California.
VI. CONCLUSION

Government attorneys in California are forced to choose
between their positions as public servants and counselors of law.
Moving the duty of confidentiality to the Rules of Professional
Conduct would enable the supreme court to better manage this
important duty, ensuring in turn that the changing needs of the legal
system are met. The supreme court could then consider the merits of
creating an exception to duty for government attorneys. Regardless
of whether this occurs, the bar should adopt a new Rule of
Professional Conduct and identify who exactly is the client of a
government attorney. Adopting one or both of these proposals
would provide clarity to attorneys who are currently forced to choose
between the legal system's requirements and their personal ethical
concerns.

278. Doskow, Ethics Rules in Flux, supra note 103, at 36.
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